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The final three-chapter section deals
with the aftermath. The cause of the fire
must be investigated, answers found,
survivors treated, the dead buried, and
the ship re-find its soul. Freeman describes well the aftermath of the tragedy
and the difficulty finding the truth when
some of the men had become primarily
concerned with themselves.
In the end the official causes were determined. Independently, two shipboard
groups had each bypassed one of two
in-place safety features, confident that
the other would suffice. Additionally,
obsolete and less fire-resistant bombs
had been transferred to Forrestal and
loaded on the attack aircraft that morning—a point not fully explored previously. While no specific personal blame
was assigned, without the negative synergy created by the convergence of these
three decisions this would most likely
have been just another unremarkable
and short-lived flight-deck fire.
JAMES E. HICKEY

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Weir, Gary E. An Ocean in Common: American
Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean Environment. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press,
2001. 403pp. $44.95

Gary Weir has scored another hit. Using
the approach he fashioned in Forged in
War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and
American Submarine Construction,
1940–1961, the head of the Contemporary Branch of the Naval Historical Center has turned his keen analytical mind
and sharp sense of political realism to
the linked topics of the U.S. Navy and
the practical science of oceanography.
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The book is divided into three chronological segments: from World War I to
1940, the Second World War, and the
Cold War up to the administration of
President John F. Kennedy. In each of
these eras the submarine exerted a transforming impact on naval strategy and
operations. The revolution began in
1914, when the U-boat explosively demonstrated the magnitude of its threat to
the security of transatlantic shipping and
to the political survival of Great Britain.
The German undersea offensive and the
resultant Anglo-American antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forcibly introduced
an unwelcome third dimension into
combat at sea, the comprehension of
which exceeded the professional and
technological competence of even the
best-educated American naval officers.
The massive, opaque, and largely uncharted subsurface domain could be
mastered as a theater for warfare only if
the Navy enlisted the expertise of oceanographers, who themselves represented
little more than a loosely organized
multidisciplinary specialty operating on
the fringe of institutional academic respectability. If the Navy needed their expertise in order to fight underwater, the
oceanographers needed the Navy’s funding in order to prosper in academe.
Weir begins his analysis of the submarine as the deus ex machina of twentieth
century, oceanographically determined
maritime warfare with a New York
meeting on antisubmarine warfare
chaired by the inventor Thomas Alva
Edison in March 1917. The specialists at
the gathering, Weir writes, “concluded
that underwater sound and echo ranging
offered the most promising avenue of
exploration for ASW scientists in the war
effort. Physics and physical oceanography thus immediately became vital to
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the national war effort.” As a result, the
characteristics of sound transmission beneath the surface of the oceans, especially the effects exerted by thermal
layers, became the focus of scientific research sponsored by the Navy. By 1918
the resulting underwater sound-sensing
and transmission systems had “helped
keep the U-boats at bay.”
World War I ended less than two years
after the United States entered, and for a
few years thereafter it seemed as if the wartime spirit of cooperation in the navalscientific inquiry into oceanography’s
utility to naval warfare would continue.
However, the Republican era was a time
of American isolationism and naval retrenchment, and by 1924 the budgetary
axe had decapitated the fledgling navalscientific hybrid. A revival of the joint effort by scientists and the Navy did not
come until 1940, but not until the attack
on Pearl Harbor did the fiscal floodgates
of defense spending on such topics truly
swing open.
In the Second World War the final form
of American naval oceanography began
to emerge. Just as the submarine is the
weapons system around which Weir
weaves his story, his concept of a cultural clash between naval officers and
scientists constitutes his institutional or
political theme. Still, as Weir points out,
“Effective submariners and ASW officers
soon realized that applied oceanography
improved a ship’s chance of survival and
increased the likelihood that crewmembers would again see their families
after a difficult North Atlantic convoy or
a submarine patrol near the Japanese
home islands.” Besides patriotic motivation, the scientists hoped that memory
of “the profitable wartime application
of oceanography and the lives spared
in combat would induce the Navy to
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become the generous patron” of postwar
oceanography.
That was how it turned out, but only
because the unanticipated Soviet submarine threat provided an irresistible
impetus for many shrewd oceanographers and some astute naval officers
who served as the “translators” between
their respective cultures. The two
groups cooperated for mutual and national benefit in the Cold War, but the
cultures of the warrior and the scientist
remained as separate as oil in water.
Their testimonials were parallel, not
unified—the invincibility of U.S. fastattack and fleet ballistic missile submarines for the Navy, and the intellectual
fecundity of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography for science.
This book is not light reading, but it is
invaluable to every serious student of
naval strategy, weapons systems, and the
marine environment that shapes and
limits modern warfare at sea.
KENNETH J. HAGAN

Naval War College
Monterey Program

Krug, Hans-Joachim, et al. Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001.
456pp. $38.95

With the exception of Carl Boyd, John
Chapman, Gerhard Krebbs, and Bernd
Martin, historians have largely ignored
German-Japanese relations in general
and naval relations in particular. (A
further exception would be Werner
Rahn; see his “Japan and Germany,
1941–1943: No Common Objective, No
Common Plans, No Basis of Trust,” in
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